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Abstract 
Phishing is a way of stealing people’s sensitive information such as username, password and banking 
details by disguising as a legitimate entity (i.e. email, website). Anti-phishing education considered to 
be vital in strengthening “human”, the weakest link in information security. Previous research in anti-
phishing education focuses on improving educational interventions to better interact the end user. 
However, one can argue that existing anti-phishing educational interventions are limited in success due 
to their outdated teaching content incorporated. Furthermore, teaching outdated anti-phishing 
techniques might not help combat contemporary phishing attacks. Therefore, this research focuses on 
investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in anti-phishing education against the 
contemporary phishing attacks reported in PhishTank.com. Our results showed that URL obfuscation 
with IP address has become insignificant and it revealed two emerging URL obfuscation techniques, that 
attackers use lately, haven’t been incorporated into existing anti-phishing educational interventions. 
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1 Introduction 
With the advancement of the Internet, World-Wide-Web and mobile devices, ordinary people are 
increasingly adapting to rely on technology in every aspect of their modern life ranging from online 
shopping, socialising, education to entertainment (Arachchilage et al., 2016). As people's reliance on the 
internet grows, Internet fraud and cybercrime have become a greater threat for both individuals and 
organisations (Arachchilage and Love, 2014). APWG1 (Anti Phishing Working Group) defines phishing 
as the act of stealing personal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, credit card 
information and online banking details using either social engineering techniques or technical 
subterfuge. The social engineering aspect of phishing sends electronic messages (i.e. email, social media, 
text, online advertisements) to lure users to enter their user-credentials at a spoofed web page which 
looks and feels identical to a legitimate site (Zhang et al., 2007). On the other hand, it could also install 
a malicious software application on the user's device or to just open an attachment. For example, a victim 
might get the same look and feel email from his bank (with the bank logo and colours), asking him to 
click on a link given in the email body to visit the bank’s website and verify the account details for a given 
security reason. The link will be directed to a counterfeit website of the targeted bank. If the user gets 
deceived by the similarity of the fake website's user interface, s/he will then enter the sensitive 
information even without noticing that s/he has become a victim of phishing. Phishing attacks use social 
engineering techniques (Khonji et al., 2011) as it’s easy to take advantage of the human mentality by 
misusing how humans assign meaning to content (i.e. phishing is also known as semantic attack 
(Arachchilage et al., 2016)) rather than breaking into the systems straightaway (Kumaraguru et al., 
2007).  
As of 2019 Webroot threat report2, the number of phishing sites detected has grown to 220% between 
January and December of 2018. According to the APGW 2019 trend report, the number of unique 
phishing websites reported in the month of March 2019 is 81122. As of 2018 FBI (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) report3, more than $1.3 billion financial losses 
have been reported in 2018 under phishing based cyber-attacks (including phishing-based Business 
Email Compromise (BEC) and E-mail Account Compromise (EAC) attacks). Apart from financial loss, 
targeted phishing attacks (spear phishing) can damage the reputation of organisations and public figures 
(Gupta et al., 2018) by exposing their private details to the public. John Podesta, the chairman of Hillary 
Clinton’s presidential campaign received an email on the 19 of March 2016, with a password reset link, 
stating that his Gmail account has been compromised4 and in need of immediate password rest. Induced 
by fear, Podesta disclosed his Gmail login credentials at the provided counterfeit website of the Gmail’s 
password reset page. Attackers got access to all important work emails including inner details of the 
Clinton campaign, internal political conflicts of the Clinton Foundation and even Podesta’s iCloud 
account password, which resulted in changing the public opinion on Hillary Clinton and her 
association’s professional conduct.  
Anti-phishing educational interventions have a major role in combating against phishing attacks by 
transforming “human” the weakest link in cybersecurity (Arachchilage et al., 2016), to the strongest 
defence. Despite the number of phishing awareness mechanisms developed over the last few decades, 
the phishing threat is growing (APWG, 2019). Previous research in anti-phishing education have focused 
on improving teaching methods (i.e. game based anti-phishing teaching (Arachchilage and Love, 2014)), 
user interactions (Dixon et al., 2019) and user behaviour modification (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Downs 
et al., 2007) as the means of mitigating phishing threat. User behaviour modifications to training users 
to pay attention to the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of the website is one of the key points in every 
anti-phishing program (Arachchilage, 2012; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012). Alsharnouby et al. (2005) 
conducted a research study using an eye-tracking device which revealed that users are paying attention 
to the URLs as they were trained in anti-phishing awareness programs.  
However, even though users pay significant attention to the URL, majority of ordinary users fail to 
recognise contemporary phishing URLs (Alsharnouby et al., 2015) if the particular obfuscation 
technique was not covered in training programs. Therefore, one can argue that existing anti-phishing 
educational interventions are limited in success due to their outdated teaching content incorporated. 
Moreover, teaching outdated anti-phishing techniques might not help combat contemporary phishing 
 
1 http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg\_trends\_report\_q1\_2019.pdf 
2 https://www-cdn.webroot.com/9315/5113/6179/2019_Webroot_Threat_Report_US_Online.pdf 
3 https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2018\_IC3Report.pdf 
4 https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-phishing-email-that-hacked-the-account-of-john-podesta 
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attacks. This research focuses on investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in anti-
phishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks reported in PhishTank.com. 
Section 2 of the paper discusses the related work and section 3 describes the methodology and design 
followed in the research. Section 4 presents the results obtained by following various analysis according 
to the research design and discuss what's missing in the phishing awareness mechanisms that are 
required to fight against the contemporary phishing threats. Finally, section 5 provides the conclusion 
of the research and possible future work to follow-up the findings in this paper. 
2 Related Work 
The approaches to mitigate phishing threat takes two directions (Qabajeh et al., 2018). One is the 
development of anti-phishing tools and security mechanisms to automate phishing threat prevention 
within the computer systems, servers and networks. The other is the development of anti-phishing 
awareness programs to prevent threats at the end-user level (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). Automated anti-
phishing tools are not foolproof (Wen et al., 2019) as they miss out at least 20 per cent of phishing attacks 
(Almomani et al., 2013). And particularly until a phishing URL is detected and registered in a spam 
database (Heartfield and Loukas, 2018), it’s disastrous to the public. The time taken to detect a new 
phishing attack depends on its complexity but estimated as 24 to 96 hours. However, the Phishing 
Threat Report by Verizon5 confirms that most people who are going to click on a malicious link in a 
phishing email do so in just over an hour and that first victim of a phishing attack falls for it within 82 
seconds of the encounter. Adding to that, more than 1.5 million new phishing sites are getting created 
every month6. Therefore, it’s a far too long goal for automated anti-phishing tools to detect all new 
phishing attack as soon as they appear and protect the early victims. On the contrary, phishing 
awareness programs gives a little hope as they can fight to phish at the end-user’s level including zero-
day attacks. 
Research in phishing awareness takes different paths such as educational programs on using security 
alert tools and indicators such as Google Safe Browsing7, IsThisLegit8 (Herzberg and Amir, 2009), 
training programs with simulated phishing attacks such as knowbe49, Cofense10, shearwater11, anti-
phishing games for end-users (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Sheng et al., 2008; Wen et al., 2019), 
behavioural studies to understand human weakness against phishing (Dhamija et al., 2006; Downs et 
al., 2007), and framework development for phishing threat measurement and awareness (Aleroud and 
Zhou, 2017; Garera et al., 2007).  
In developing a phishing awareness program, apart from identifying efficient methods of teaching, 
selecting the content of the program is vital. As mentioned earlier, training users to examine the URL of 
a website is one of the key areas in anti-phishing education. Phishing awareness programs and anti-
phishing games (Arachchilage and Love, 2014, 2016; Sheng et al., 2008) have given priority in training 
users to identify phishing URLs using the cues embodied within the URL itself. The nature of phishing 
attacks and obfuscating techniques used in phishing URLs, have been analysed and discussed over a 
decade ago (Dhamija et al., 2006; Garera et al., 2007). The malicious URL features identified during 
machine learning attempts on phishing URL classification research (Garera et al., 2007; Khonji et al., 
2011; Ma et al., 2009; Whittaker et al., 2010) reveals more information on phishing attack 
demographics. Anti-phishing educational programs developed in the past have used these classification 
results that are visible to the human eye (Alsharnouby et al., 2015; Arachchilage et al., 2016). 
2.1 URL obfuscating Techniques 
The term URL obfuscation stands for the innovative ways used by phishers to create deceiving phishing 
URLs by carefully placing cue words in a URL to trick human mind. The interesting study by Garera et 
al. (Garera et al., 2007) has categorised prominent obfuscation techniques by examining the blacklist of 
phishing URLs maintained by Google in 2007 (Garera et al., 2007).  
 
5 https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary.pdf 
6 https://www-cdn.webroot.com/9315/5113/6179/2019_Webroot_Threat_Report_US_Online.pdf 
7 https://safebrowsing.google.com 
8 https://github.com/duo-labs/isthislegit 
9 https://www.knowbe4.com 
10 https://cofense.com 
11https://www.shearwater.com.au/ 
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• Type I: Obfuscating the Hostname with an IP Address - URL's hostname (Netloc component) is 
obfuscated by the phisher using an IP address. Very often the IP address is also represented in 
hex or decimal format rather than the common dotted quad form. An example of this type of 
URL is: http://67.210.122.222/ apple/login. 
• Type II: Obfuscating the host with another domain - A valid looking domain name is used in the 
"path" component of the URL and trick the user to see it as a redirect URL. https://recovery-
confrim-paqe.cf/?facebook.com=chekpoint. 
• Type III: Obfuscating with large hostnames - In this type of obfuscation, phisher appends a large 
string of words at the end of a genuine-looking domain name to deceive the target user. 
• Type IV: Domain name unknown or misspelt - The phishing URL may contain a domain name 
which is different to the target organisation. This can either be an unknown domain or a misspelt 
version of the legitimate domain. As example is: http://www.g0og1e.com. 
There has been much research in the past actively using these obfuscation categories with different 
features in phishing URL identification, yet have not introduced new categories to the literature (Cui et 
al., 2018; Darling et al., 2015; Le et al., 2011; Musuva et al., 2019; Qabajeh et al., 2018; Shirazi et al., 
2018). Especially, the phishing awareness mechanisms developed since then have used these URL 
obfuscation techniques as the basis in organising the teaching content (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Sheng 
et al., 2008, 2008; Wen et al., 2019). The content of anti-phishing educational games also follows the 
same pattern of simulated phishing attacks where they synthetically develop the possible phishing URLs 
by following the URL obfuscation techniques. Furthermore, Le et al. in 2011 have revealed that URL 
features alone are enough to identify malicious URLs (Le et al., 2011). Within the URL obfuscation 
techniques, the Bag of Word approach has also been employed where users are trained to suspect URLs 
that contain top trick words identified. Simulated phishing awareness programs10 11 highly use these 
words to train people to look carefully. 
Since the URL obfuscation techniques presented by Garera et al. 2007 have remained unchanged for 
many years now, the topicality of these techniques against the contemporary phishing URLs is an 
important research question. Importantly the anti-phishing tools and awareness programs developed 
based on these obfuscation techniques run the risk of being outdated (Arachchialge, 2012). It's 
interesting to see that, while developing PhishDef (Le et al., 2011) in 2011 the researchers have extended 
the word-based features by Garera et al. (2007), yet have used all other concepts without any change. 
We identified that existing phishing awareness interventions haven’t conducted a thorough analysis of 
contemporary phishing URLs before program development as they are depending on the phishing URL 
categorisations of Garera et al. 2007. 
On the other hand, the evaluation criteria employed in existing phishing awareness programs are also 
focused on measuring user interaction improvement and success rate of user behaviour modification 
techniques with pre and post-tests (Arachchilage et al., 2016; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Sheng et al., 
2008; Wen et al., 2019; Wu, 2006). However, the primary expectation of anti-phishing education is to 
improve users’ security knowledge to combat against the contemporary phishing attacks (Musuva et al., 
2019). Cybercriminals are continuously learning and keep inventing various new strategies 
(Kumaraguru et al., 2007). Therefore, investigating the URL obfuscation techniques used in anti-
phishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks is a timely requirement. 
3 Methodology and Research Design 
This research focused on investigating the obfuscation techniques of phishing URLs used in anti-
phishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks. Previous research on phishing 
classification research has been investigated in the binary classification of phishing attacks where they 
decided whether or not a given URL is malicious (Darling et al., 2015; Whittaker et al., 2010). On the 
other hand, phishing attack measurement studies such as Garera et al. 2007 have categorised the 
phishing attacks based on their characteristics. Therefore, we conducted a follow-up analysis of the URL 
obfuscation techniques against contemporary phishing URLs from PhishTank.com12.  
3.1 Data Used 
Our study obtained a contemporary phishing URL dataset downloaded from PhishTank12 on 05th May 
2019. PhishTank.com12 is a well-known non-profit community database that maintains a blacklist of 
 
12 https://www.phishtank.com 
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phishing URLs reported and verified by volunteers. For this study, we downloaded the dataset in a CSV 
file and it contained a total of 10078 verified phishing URLs. The collected phishing URLs ranged from 
real-world phishing attempts reported between 2008 and 2019. We used the Python programming 
language13 to conduct the initial feature analysis of phishing URLs due to the cost-effective and 
supportive nature. URL Parsing Library (URLLib14) was used for the lexical analysis on the URL 
components described in Figure1.  
 
Figure 1: URL structure 
3.2 Structure of URLs 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL), or the web address, is a reference to a web resource that specifies its 
location on a computer network (Berners-Lee et al., 2005). As highlighted in the literature, previous 
research has proved that careful attention to URL lexical is sufficient enough (Le et al., 2011) to identify 
the legitimacy of a website. IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) (Berners-Lee et al., 2005) has 
specified the URL structure in 6 components as per Figure 1. Table 1 shows the URL component 
distribution in our dataset. We analysed the PhishTank12 dataset against below URL components to 
identify the URL obfuscation techniques that can be used to train end-users to detect phishing threats. 
URL 
Component 
Description % of dataset (2019) 
(N=10078) 
Scheme  network communication protocol i.e. http, "https", "ftp" "mailto" 100% 
Netloc 
(Hostname)  
network location - primary hostname or domain 100% 
Path hierarchical path from root domain to the target web page 99.5% 
Parameters URL parameter (Path Param) to identify a specific resource 0.4% 
Query provides filtration to resources available in the given path 19.8% 
Fragment contains a fragment identifier 0.7% 
Table 1. URL components distribution in our dataset 
3.3 Feature Analysis 
This research followed a similar approach of phishing URL analysis presented in the work by Garera et 
al. 2007. Their study has categorised website features into four groups as Page Based, Domain Based, 
Type Based and Word-Based features. From that Type Based features (URL obfuscation types) and 
Word-Based features (suggestive token words found in URLs) have been analysed under website URL 
features. Following that, in this research, the contemporary phishing URLs obtained from PhishTank11 
were analysed under Type-based features and Word-based features and compared with the results 
presented in the study by Garera et al. (2007).  
Our study retrieved 10078 phishing URLs from PhishTank11, whereas Garera et al. (2007) have had only 
1245 phishing URLs in their training blacklist dataset from Google. The results were compared in terms 
of percentages to better understand the composition of URL obfuscation techniques. Under type based 
features we analysed the availability of Type I (Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address) and Type II 
(Obfuscating the host with another domain) within the contemporary phishing URL dataset and 
compared that with the results of Garera et al. (Garera et al., 2007). Type III obfuscation technique 
(Obfuscating with large URLs) is on the length of the URL, especially on the misleading characters added 
at the end of a legitimate domain. Then the study was conducted on the word-based features presented 
in Garera et al. (2007) to understand the suggestive word tokens in contemporary phishing URLs. 
 
13 https://www.python.org 
14 https://docs.python.org/3/library/urllib.html 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems  Fernando & Arachchilage 
2019, Perth  Why Johnny can’t rely on anti-phishing educational interventions? 
  6 
4 Results and Discussion 
We investigated the contemporary phishing attacks reported in real-world against the URL obfuscation 
techniques that are used in anti-phishing educational content development. Our results showed that the 
composition of URL obfuscation techniques has significantly changed over time. The Type I 
(Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address), which was a popular obfuscation technique in 2007 with 
63.6% of occurrence only has an insignificant value of 1.03% in our contemporary dataset. The usage of 
Type II obfuscation technique (Obfuscating the host with another domain) also have reduced in the 
contemporary dataset by having 26.9% of occurrence.  
There were many phishing URLs in our contemporary dataset that do not fit into any of the four existing 
URL obfuscation techniques (i.e. four categories identified by Garera et al. (2007)). Therefore, we 
analysed the contemporary phishing URL dataset itself to identify new obfuscation techniques. We 
revealed, in addition to Garera et al’s. (2007) 4 categories, two major obfuscation techniques which have 
not been incorporated into anti-phishing teaching content. It also showed that the most common word 
tokens used by phishers have changed over time. Therefore, we further analysed the contemporary 
dataset from PhishTank15 to identify new suggestive word tokens. 
4.1 Type Based Features 
Table 2 shows the comparison of Type I (Obfuscating hostname with an IP Address i.e. http:// 
67.210.122.222/apple/login) and Type II (Obfuscating the host with another domain i.e. https:// 
recovery-confrim-paqe.cf/?facebook.com=chekpoint) URL obfuscation techniques. As shown in Table 
2, Type I obfuscation techniques is rarely found in contemporary phishing URLs, we obtained in 2019. 
Type II obfuscation technique has also decreased by 12.8% in 2019. Data available in PhishTank.com12 
under the spoofed organisation (which indicates the name of the organisation used in the URL path) 
was used to identify the Type II Obfuscation Technique. In our dataset, there were only 2718 URLs with 
the identified spoofed organisation. However, the majority of the URLs had unresolved target 
organisations due to the complexity of the URL formulation. For example, “https://www.wireless-
handsets.com/blueprintcsg/verificationAttempt.php?sf58g...” seems like a wireless headset sales 
company and users fell for it. However, there is no existing company or legitimate website under that 
name and this falls under the category of unresolved target organisations. 
URL Obfuscation Technique Garera et al. (2007) (N=1245) Current dataset (2019) (N=10078) 
Type I - Obfuscating hostname 
with an IP Address 
63.6% 1.03% 
Type II - Obfuscating the host 
with another domain 
39.7% 26.9 % 
Table 2. Type I and Type II comparison on phishing URLs from 2007 (Garera et al., 2007) vs 2019 
In analysing the Type III obfuscation technique (Obfuscating with large URLs), the URLs with large 
domain names were identified and then we checked if that domain has words placed intentionally 
(delimited by ‘-’, ‘_’, ‘=’, ‘?’, ‘%’) to imitate a target organisation name. For example, 
“https://nz1webapps7mpp3manage-my-papl-account.felixkot.biz/signin...”, has a large domain name 
with suggestive words placed in the subdomain to make it look like it is linked to paypal.com. In the 
analysis by Garera et al. (2007), the average length of additional characters appended to the domain 
name of phishing URL was 7.34 characters and the maximum length was 63. In our phishing dataset, 
the average length of additional characters appended to the domain was 9.32 with the maximum length 
of 73.88 characters. With the results, it seems the Type III obfuscation techniques apply to current data. 
In early 2019, there has been a few attempts of phishing with more than 1000 characters in the URL 
(Abrams, 2019) using the Obfuscation with a large URL technique (Type III). The largest URL in our 
dataset had 1149 characters. Therefore, we can expect phishing attacks with more complex URLs in the 
future. 
4.2 New URL Obfuscation Techniques for Anti-Phishing Education 
As our findings revealed that URL obfuscation techniques identified by Garera et al. 2007 (that have 
been incorporated into existing anti-phishing teaching content) are not aligning with the real-world 
 
15 https://www.phishtank.com 
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contemporary phishing threats, we analysed the contemporary dataset itself to investigate new URL 
obfuscation techniques. The results below would look obvious for any technically savvy individual, yet 
not included in anti-phishing teaching content, and therefore non-technical end-users are highly 
susceptible.  
4.2.1 Type V: Obfuscating with HTTPS Schema 
Technically the HTTPS schema represents the secure and encrypted data communication protocol 
between the user's browser and the target site. Browsers display a green padlock icon in the address bar 
only to represent secure communication and it is not related to the legitimacy of the website. However 
according to the survey conducted by PhishLab16 more than 80% of non-technical users believe green 
lock and https indicate that a website is either legitimate and/or safe16.  
 
Figure 2: Https with Green Padlock for phishing URL that targets Paypal.com 
Figure 2 shows a phishing website with SSL/TLS certificate and green padlock. Our findings 
demonstrate that phishers are increasingly exploiting user’s misbelief in https schema for their 
advantage. Table 6 displays the 3231 https URLs we found in our dataset with increased usage pattern 
over the years. 
Year Occurrences 
of https 
Total phishing attacks of the year 
in the current dataset 
Percentage of 
https URLs  
2019 (until 05/05/2019) 1477 3930 37.58% 
2018 1543 4068 37.93% 
2017 182 1249 14.57% 
2016 16 488 3.27% 
2015 3 233 1.28% 
Table 6. Https protocol usage in Phishing URLs 
Here we introduce the Type V obfuscation technique – “Obfuscating with HTTPS schema”, as an 
additional category type to phishing URL obfuscation categories proposed by Garera et al. 2007. 
4.2.2 Type VI: Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain Names 
Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) are domain names represented by non-ASCII local language 
characters (Richard Ishida (W3C), 2008). IDN was the solution to improve the usability of the Internet 
for millions of non-English speaking users by enabling to have domain names in non-ASCII characters. 
Punycode is an algorithm employed by web protocols to transform a Unicode string into an ASCII string 
(RFC349217). Punycode sequences always start with the prefix "xn--" simply to distinguish IDNs from 
ordinary domain names. The punycode  for the URL in Figure 3 is “xn--oy2b35ckwhba574atvuzkc.com”. 
 
Figure 3: IDN with local language 
However, IDN has been exploited by phishers (Liu et al., 2018) in their advantage to mislead the end-
users with Unicode characters that have similar appearances to ASCII characters, which are 
undetectable in browser address bars. For example, “https://www.apple.com” is not the actual apple 
URL as the “a" of apple.com is a Cyrillic “a" (U+0430) rather than the ASCII character “a" (U+0061). 
The punycode for the Cyrillic character URL is https://www.xn--pple-43d.com/. We found 24 IDN 
URLs in our dataset with increased usage pattern over the years in Table 7.  
Year Occurrences in Current dataset (2019) 
(N=10078) 2019 (until 05/05/2019) 12 
2018 8 
 
16 https://info.phishlabs.com/blog/quarter-phishing-attacks-hosted-https-domains 
17 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3492.txt 
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2017 1 
2016 1 
2015 0 
Table 7. Usage of IDN in Phishing URLs for camouflage 
As the usage of IDN in 2019 until 05/05/2019 has already passed the total number of usages before 
2019, we can expect more IDN based phishing attacks in the coming years. Therefore, we introduce this 
as the Type VI obfuscation technique – “Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain names”, as an 
extension to phishing URL obfuscation types proposed by Garera et al (2007). 
4.3 Word Based Features 
Word based feature analysis is a commonly used technique in most of automated phishing detection 
tools (Cui et al., 2018; Jain and Gupta, 2018; Khonji et al., 2011; Marchal et al., 2016) as it provides more 
contextual information on the legitimacy of the URL text. Also, the blacklisted bag of words enhances 
the detection of Type IV URL obfuscation technique (obfuscating with unknown or misspelt Domain 
name). As per the findings of Garera et al (2007), phishing URLs are found to be containing several 
suggestive word tokens frequently. We examined our contemporary phishing URL dataset against these 
words to understand whether or not they are still prominent. The comparisons were non case-sensitive 
and Boolean (where we only checked whether or not a given word is present in a URL). 
Special Words Garera et al. (2007) (N=1245) Current dataset (2019) (N=10078) 
confirm 4.25% 0.893% 
account 4.9% 5.040 % 
banking 7.95%  0.188% 
secure 9.88%  3.006% 
ebayisapi 13.9% 0.019% 
webscr 14.2% 0.367% 
login 21.53% 13.177% 
signin 23.29% 2.937% 
Table 3. Word Token feature comparison on phishing URLs in 2007 (Garera et al., 2007) and current 
dataset from PhishTank12 (2019) 
From the results in Table 3, we can see that except the words “account” and “login” other special words 
identified by Garera et al. (2007) are no longer found common in the contemporary phishing URLs. The 
usage of word “signin” as dropped by more than 20%. The decreased numbers in words like “webscr” or 
“ebayisapi” suggests that the changes in the web development technologies might have influenced 
phishers and the way they phish.  
In developing PhishDef, the anti-phishing tool (Le et al., 2011), researchers have added four more words 
("paypal", "free", "lucky", "bonus") to the suggestive word list of Garera et al. 2007 as an extension. 
Therefore, we analysed the frequency of these four words in our dataset to understand the current 
situation of using words based features on phishing URLs in 2019. Results in Table 4 showed that the 
frequency of the words also has deprived now. 
Special Words Percentage in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078) 
paypal 2.431% 
free 1.716% 
lucky 0.039% 
bonus 0.089% 
Table 4. Usage of Word Token features added by Le et al. (Le et al., 2011) current dataset from 
PhishTank12 (2019) 
4.3.1 Lexicon for Phishing URLs in 2019 
The results we discussed in above revealed that frequent suggestive words identified by previous 
research do not occur in contemporary phishing attacks, we further examined the word frequency in the 
dataset retrieved from PhishTank11. Table 5 shows the ten most common words in our contemporary 
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phishing URL dataset and apart from "login" and "account" all other 8 are new lexicons. Here we 
followed the same filtration criteria used by Garera et al. 2007 and discarded all tokens with length<5 
as they contained several common technical terms used in website development. 
Words Total No. of URLs Percentage in Current dataset (2019) (N=10078) 
Login 1328 13.177% 
Account 508 5.040% 
Content 505 5.010% 
Include 496 4.921% 
Online 478 4.743% 
Sites 461 4.574% 
Admin 455 4.514% 
Email 431 4.276% 
Secur 422 4.187% 
image 394 3.909% 
update 304 3.016% 
Table 5. Frequency of Word Tokens in the current dataset from PhishTank12 (2019) 
5 Conclusion and Future Work 
This research focused on investigating the phishing URL obfuscation techniques incorporated in anti-
phishing education against the contemporary phishing attacks. The URL obfuscation techniques 
presented a decade ago by Garera et al. 2007 are still being used in anti-phishing educational 
interventions. Over time attackers have abandoned the already identified and educated methods of URL 
obfuscation techniques and keep inventing new ways of deceiving. Our research findings revealed that 
the URL obfuscation techniques used in existing anti-phishing teaching do not help people to detect 
contemporary phishing attacks. The Type I obfuscation technique (Obfuscating hostname with an IP 
Address) presented by Garera et al. 2007 had 33.32% representation of the total phishing attacks, yet in 
our contemporary dataset, it has only 1.03% of insignificant usage. Adding to that, Type II (Obfuscating 
the host with another domain) technique has also decreased by 12.8%. Therefore, one can argue that 
existing anti-phishing educational interventions are limited in success in mitigating contemporary 
phishing attacks due to their outdated teaching content incorporated. Moreover, teaching outdated anti-
phishing techniques might not help combating contemporary phishing attacks. In addition to Garera et 
al’s (2007) categorisation, we have also identified two new URL obfuscating techniques, which are:  
1. Type V - Obfuscating with HTTPS schema.  
2. Type VI - Obfuscating with Internationalized Domain names  
Identified two new obfuscation techniques have a trending usage for phishing where 37.58% of phishing 
URLs of 2019 (until 05/05/2019) have used https schema. 12 IDN URLs have been reported until 
05/05/2019, which is higher than the total number of IDNs reported in previous years. These new 
obfuscation techniques need to be incorporated into contemporary teaching content (in our case, 
phishing URLs) of anti-phishing educational interventions to better educate end users to prevent 
phishing attacks. Apart from that, these two new URL obfuscation techniques can also be used as 
features in creating new automated phishing detection tools. In future work, we will analyse various 
contemporary phishing datasets to identify more hidden URL obfuscation techniques, which have not 
been incorporated in developing anti-phishing educational interventions.  
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